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Abstract
The U.S. tort system has experienced various reforms over the last three decades. While there is an
extensive literature on the consequences of these reforms, very little is known about their determinants. In
this study, we investigate the role of party politics in the reform process across U.S. states. In order to test
whether any party effect goes beyond voter preferences, we apply the idea behind regression discontinuity
studies based on close electoral outcomes to semi-parametric proportional hazards models. We find that
in states with close election outcomes, a narrow Republican majority in the lower house is associated with
a 50 to 150 percent higher risk of tort reform enactment compared to a narrow Democratic majority. Our
results indicate that party politics plays a role in tort reforms goes over and above potential underlying
preferences in the constituency. (JEL classification: D72, K13)
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1 Introduction
Since the 1980s the reform of tort law1 has become an increasingly important political issue in the United
States. Many state legislatures have passed statutes to reshape their mainly common-law-based law of torts.
While the nature and extent of these reform efforts vary significantly across U.S. states, the reforms generally
point in the same direction and aim at a reduction in the number of tort suits as well as the amount of
damages awarded. The reform process as well as the expansion of tort liability and damages preceding it in
the 1960s and 1970s are difficult to understand as an evolutionary process towards an efficient system. They
reflect, rather, a complicated interaction of interest representation in the compensation of injured parties
that has become big business.2
In this paper, we study the role of party politics in legislative tort reforms in U.S. states. It has been
argued that tort reforms became a highly partisan topic, with Republicans taking sides with the business
community and being in favor of reforms and Democrats being pro plaintiff and against reforms (Sugarman
2002), although these positions are historically and ideologically unclear (Sugarman 2006). The two parties
channel many different politico-economic forces. The Democrats’ opposition to tort reforms goes along with
generous campaign contributions from trial lawyers (Zywicki 2000). It has also long been argued that special
interest groups shape U.S. tort law in their pursuit of economic rents (e.g., Epstein 1988, Rubin and Bailey
1994, Rubin 2005, Zywicki 2000). The legal changes that expanded tort liability were mainly brought about
by litigation and judicial action favored and supported by organized groups of attorneys (see Rubin et al.
2001 for theoretical arguments as well as observational evidence).3 In response, defense interests began to
form around groups of businesses and medical doctors.4 For them, the legislative process was relatively
more accessible than the judicial process, and tort reform became an important issue in the political arena
(Campbell et al. 1995). Lobbying for changes in tort law led to many reform proposals over the last 30 years,
and these were put forward and decided on in state legislatures. We want to understand whether there is a
systematic partisan component to this process that can at least partly explain the patchwork of tort reforms
across U.S. states.
1Tort law deals with situations where one party’s behavior causes another party to suffer a loss or harm. The law allows
the party who is harmed to recover its loss. The aims of tort law, however, are not confined to insurance and compensation
but damages may also be awarded for deterrence. The economic analysis of tort law emphasizes this latter aim based on the
argument of an efficient distribution of risk in order to provide optimal incentives for cost minimizing precautions in the presence
of transaction or litigation costs (for basic contributions, see Coase 1960, Calabresi 1970 and Shavell 1987).
2Estimates of the total transactions generated by the American tort law system amount to USD 265 billion in 2010; i.e.,
1.82% of GDP. This indicates a decline from 2.21% of GDP (or USD 246 billion in current prices) in 2003 (Towers Watson
2012). Expenses in terms of fees and administrative costs, i.e., money not flowing as compensation to injured parties, account
for more than half of the amount (U.S. Council of Economic Advisers 2004).
3The most important player is the American Association for Justice (AAJ), formerly the Association of Trial Lawyers of
America (ATLA).
4From the numerous business groups involved in pushing reforms, the U.S. Chamber of Commerce is a prominent one. Many
businesses support the American Tort Reform Association (ATRA).
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In this empirical analysis, we are particularly aiming at identifying any partisan effect that goes beyond
potential underlying voter preferences for reforms in statutory tort law. One might well argue that greater
support for and a stronger presence of the Republican Party in the legislature or when holding the gov-
ernorship reflects voters’ demand for tort reforms. Indeed, if reforms were to be found more likely under
a Republican majority or governor, this would be evidence for a systematic influence of politico-economic
forces. However, the evidence would not allow distinguishing between underlying voter preferences and a
specific partisan effect. In the empirical analysis, we therefore, first, take citizens’ general political attitudes
into account when we test whether at any point in time a reform restricting tort liability in a U.S. state is
introduced earlier with a stronger representation of Republicans in state politics. Second, we concentrate on
the enactment of reforms when either party holds the legislative majority or the governorship with a close
margin.
In our analysis of the reform process, we refer to the area of medical malpractice.5 We analyze data from
the Database of State Tort Law Reforms (Avraham 2011a), which contains the most prevalent medical mal-
practice tort reforms between 1980 and 2008. Avraham (2011a) distinguishes between eleven different types
of non-wrongful death medical malpractice tort reforms. We concentrate on the five types of reforms that are
most intensively discussed in the literature; i.e., caps on punitive damages, punitive evidence reform, caps on
non-economic damages, reforms of the collateral source rule and reforms of the joint and several liability rule.
Our empirical strategy combines the idea of regression discontinuity studies based on close electoral outcomes
with methods of survival analysis in order to empirically disentangle the politico-economic forces outlined
above. Specifically, we estimate different specifications of semi-parametric proportional hazards models to
calculate the effects of a Republican majority in the legislature as well as of a Republican governor on the
hazard of tort reform passage, given the relative strength of the parties. This approach allows us to exploit
the cross-sectional as well as the longitudinal variation in the data. We adopt a broad view of the reform
process and look jointly at repeated reform events across different domains of medical malpractice tort law
in each state.
We find that the reform process overall can be well described as a partisan fight between the Republicans
and the Democrats, whereby a narrow Republican majority in a state’s lower house is associated with a 50
to 150 percent higher instantaneous risk of reform enactment in any given year than a narrow Democratic
majority. A multiplicative effect on the hazard that is larger than one is also estimated for Republican
governors. However, the result is not statistically significant in all specifications. These effects hold indepen-
dently of differences in the liability risk in the early 1980s, the political orientation of the population, and
5The other main areas are automobile accident law and product liability law.
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a number of other control variables. Furthermore, the evidence regarding the reform process at the macro
level complements recent evidence on individual voting behavior on single tort reform proposals in various
tort areas at the micro level. In Matter and Stutzer (2015), we find that Republicans are more likely and
lawyer-legislators less likely to support reforms that restrict tort litigation.
This paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 discusses related work and reviews the literature on the con-
sequences of (medical malpractice) tort reforms. In Section 3, we develop our politico-economic hypotheses
regarding the legislative reforms in medical malpractice law. Section 4 outlines the empirical strategy based
on survival analysis. The data for the empirical tests is described in Section 5. Section 6 presents the results.
Concluding remarks are offered in Section 7.
2 Related work and literature review
We see our analysis as a complement to the literature on the consequences of alternative tort regimes and
specific regulations. This literature has accumulated an interesting body of empirical findings, whereby the
design of tort law is considered an exogenous factor.
It might thus be interesting to understand the conditions under which reforms are more likely. Moreover,
reform enactments might well reflect specific politico-economic constellations that affect the legal environment
in areas that are complementary to tort law. We are not aware of many systematic empirical analyses that
try to explain the reform process so far. In related work, Klick and Sharkey (2009) examine the effect of
jury awards on the passage of damage caps. They find no statistical relationship between these two factors.
Miceli and Stone (2013) restrict their study to caps on punitive damages and focus on parametric hazard
analysis. They observe a positive relationship between legal services employment and the hazard of cap
enactment as well as that rather liberal states have a lower hazard of cap enactment. In our analysis, we
look at reforms in five domains and concentrate on semi-parametric proportional hazards models, since the
underlying distribution of the baseline hazard is theoretically undetermined.
The literature on the consequences of alternative tort regimes is much richer. For example, Avraham
(2007) investigates the impact of six different types of tort reforms on the frequency, size and number of total
settlements in medical malpractice cases between 1991 and 1998. He shows that caps on pain and suffering
damages and limitations on joint and several liability reduced the number of annual damage payments, while
the periodic-payment reform and, again, caps on pain and suffering damages reduced average awards. Paik
et al. (2013), taking the gradual phase-in of damage caps into consideration, find strong negative effects of
this reform on claim rates as well as on payout per claim. Moreover, they present evidence suggesting that
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claim rates specifically decrease in claims with larger payouts and that stricter caps are associated with larger
effects. Conversely, Donohue and Ho (2007) find no evidence that caps on pain and suffering as well as on
punitive damages had any effect on the number of claims, using (nonparametric) randomization inference with
differences-in-differences. Viscusi and Born (2005) find that medical malpractice reforms reduced the losses
and increased the profitability of insurance companies. Klick and Stratmann (2007) show, using a triple-
differences design to capture potential endogeneity of the passage of medical malpractice reforms, that caps on
non-economic damages positively affect the number of doctors in high-risk specialties in a state. Additionally,
Helland and Showalter (2009) find evidence that an increase in expected liability costs is associated with a
decrease in a physician’s hours worked. Rubin and Shepherd (2007) study the impact of different types of
tort reforms on non-motor-vehicle accidental death rates and present significant positive as well as negative
effects, depending on the type of tort reform. While non-economic damages caps, punitive evidence reform,
product liability reform as well as prejudgment interest reform significantly decrease the number of accidental
deaths, collateral source rule reform significantly increases the number of accidental deaths. Building on these
results, Rubin and Shepherd (2008) as well as Shepherd (2008) show that the non-motor-vehicle accidental
death rates of women and men are affected differently by malpractice tort reform; i.e., the death rate for
women is increased, while that for men is decreased. Carvell et al. (2012) provide evidence that joint and
several liability tort reforms have been accompanied by reductions in the non-auto, non-overdose accidental
death rate. However, Frakes and Jena (2014) find only small and statistically insignificant effects of changes in
malpractice pressure (in terms of non-economic damages caps) on different measures of health care treatment
quality. Similarly, Sloan and Shadle (2009) conclude, based on the analysis of eight different reform types, that
neither medical decisions nor patient outcomes are systematically affected by tort reforms. Finally, Kessler
and McClellan (1996) and Currie and MacLeod (2008) assess the effect of malpractice reform on the practice
of defensive medicine. Kessler and McClellan (1996) find that reduced liability pressure leads providers to
reduce medical expenditures in treatment of serious heart disease without substantial negative effects on the
rate of mortality. In a similar vein, Currie and MacLeod (2008) investigate whether certain types of tort
reform affect the choice of birth procedures and, related to this, the health outcomes of mothers and their
infants. They find that joint and several liability reforms reduce the probability of cesarean delivery as well
as complications of labor and delivery, while damage caps increase the probability of additional procedures
and complications.
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3 Politico-economic determinants of reforms in medical malpractice
law
3.1 The evolution of medical malpractice tort law
The judicial process in the United States brought about a common law tort regime during the 1960s and 1970s
that strengthened the position of victims and their (plaintiff) lawyers. These legal changes allowed plaintiffs
to sue for high non-compensatory (punitive) damages and lawyers to share in the awards. A large popular
and scientific literature controversially discusses the merits and flaws of this system. The same holds for the
assessment of the backlash that occurred when defense interests from industry and the medical profession
started lobbying in state legislatures for reforms to curb the tort system (Rubin 2005). Five types of reforms
are of particular importance:
1. Caps on punitive damages: Statutes that either ban punitive damages outright or limit them to a
maximum amount.
2. Punitive evidence reform: Statutes of this reform-type require a higher burden of proof for recovery of
punitive damages. Such statutes often require the plaintiff to present “clear and convincing” evidence
that the defendant acted maliciously.
3. Caps on non-economic damages: Reforms in this domain include statutory limits to damage awards for
psychological losses such as damages for pain and suffering.
4. Collateral source rule reforms: Under the collateral source rule, defendants were not allowed to present
evidence at trial proving that a plaintiff had already been compensated for a loss from another source of
remuneration; e.g., her insurance. Statutes that abolish or limit this rule are subsumed in this reform
type.
5. Joint and several liability reforms: If the harm is caused by two or more parties, the joint and several
liability rule enables plaintiffs to sue any of these for the whole amount of damages, regardless of their
relative responsibility. Reforms considered in this category usually limit the rule of joint and several
liability in such a way that any party causing harm can only be sued for its proportion of fault.
Figure 1 illustrates the reform process in terms of the enactment of these five reform types across the U.S.
states during the period of observation in our study; i.e., 1980 to 2008.6 In all these law changes, reformers
6More descriptive details on the tort reform process are presented in Section 5.
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understand that the transaction value of tort cases, and therefore liability pressure, is reduced. We do not
aim at assessing the pros and cons of these reforms for the consumers and patients.7 We rather want to gain
a better understanding of the reform process as such, in particular, the role of political parties as brokers of
(specific) interests within state politics. Is there a pattern in the patchwork of legislative tort reforms that is
systematically related to political conditions over and above the economic ones in the U.S. states?
Figure 1: Number of reforms enacted across the U.S. states between 1980 and 2008
1980 2008
Number of reforms enacted 0 1 2 3 4 5
Data source: Avraham (2011).
3.2 Basic hypotheses
We structure the various forces that affect the tort reform process according to three basic hypotheses. First,
there is the perspective that reforms reflect legal changes towards more efficient arrangements. Tort reforms
are more likely to come about where there is a particular reform pressure. In states with a higher liability
risk for physicians, we thus expect tort reforms to be more likely at any point in time. We think of this force
as one that is necessary to take into account in order to approximate to ceteris paribus conditions for the
other factors.
Second, we might start from the benchmark that legislative tort reforms reflect voters’ preferences due
to electoral competition in the democratic process. For instance, in states where more people share political
attitudes that favor individual responsibility on the part of consumers, tort reforms are expected to be more
likely. Thereby, pressure from voters may affect policy reforms or citizens may directly elect candidates with
particular policy preferences (see Lee et al. 2004 for a discussion). However, this hypothesis is difficult to test
7Key references to the evaluation literature are provided in Section 2.
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directly, as indicators on people’s attitudes towards the tort regime in their state are rare. Instead, we rely
on the general political attitudes in a state as reflected in their representatives’ voting behavior in Congress.8
Furthermore, citizens’ interests are notoriously difficult to organize because of the free rider problem (Olson
1965) and a strong hypothesis is thus not warranted.
Third, there is the view of politics as a platform where parties organize the brokerage of different interests.
Tort reforms are understood to be the result of a lobbying process involving competing well-organized interest
groups. In particular, business associations and associations of physicians are expected to engage in spurring
the reform process in order to reduce the likelihood and magnitude of damage awards that their members have
to pay or insure against. Opposition is expected from lawyers who benefit substantially from the litigation
business. The demand for tort lawyers and thus their income opportunities increase with the amount and
the value of tort litigation as well as with the cost of litigation; i.e., with the complexity of the tort system.
Therefore not only do plaintiffs’ lawyers benefit professionally and financially from an increased demand for
their services, but also defense lawyers (Olson 2003) and transactions lawyers.
In the context of U.S. tort reforms, the lobbying process is often described as a battle, as it has become a
partisan issue, with the Democrats fighting against reforms and the Republicans fighting in favor of reforms.
This involves the members of the legislatures as well as the governors, who play an important role in the
appointment of judges in many states and who might also influence the legislative reform process with their
veto right. The partisan orientation is often explained by the large financial support that the Democrats
receive from trial lawyer associations (Zywicki 2000). However, this is not an obvious link, as lobby groups do
not want to depend on members of one party alone, but, rather, rely on logrolling and gaining support across
the political spectrum. Furthermore, while the Republicans’ idea of a laissez-faire economy surely agrees
with product liability reforms that aim to remove the burden of potential damages from the manufacturing
industry, it is not clear that the same rationale and political ideology also applies to medical malpractice,
particularly when one considers that the concept of tort law also represents the “[...] principle of personal
responsibility for wrong doing, and this is normally a core conservative value” (Sugarman 2006: 1105).
Overall, it is difficult to discriminate between the hypothesis emphasizing voter preferences and that
highlighting special interests. The forces in both cases are difficult to measure and agents in favor of reforms
tend to be more likely to support the Republicans. In order to get at the partisan channel representing an
amalgam of ideology and special interests, we focus on close electoral outcomes.
8Specifically, we draw on the voting records that are summarized in the so-called DW-Nominate scores (first dimension) and
reflect a conservative to liberal score of the representatives.
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4 Empirical strategy
4.1 Identification of a partisan effect
In order to disentangle a specific partisan effect from correlated political forces, such as the preferences in
the constituency, we exploit the idea suggested in studies relying on regression discontinuity designs (RDD)
based on close electoral outcomes (Lee 2001, Lee et al. 2004, Pettersson-Lidbom 2008, Ferreira and Gyourko
2009, Lee and Lemieux 2010, Albouy 2013). The intuition behind our approach is simple. If political
and/or economic forces from the constituency drive tort reforms and are simultaneously correlated with a
stronger Republican representation in U.S. states, we would expect the relationship between the risk of reform
enactment and the share of Republicans in a legislature (or a Republican Governor) to be positive, monotonic
and continuous. If, however, Republican party politics itself is a relevant driver of reform enactment, a narrow
Republican majority would lead to a disproportional increase in the risk of reform enactment compared to a
narrow Democratic majority. In other words, the probability of tort reform enactment as a function of the
Republican vote share would be discontinuous at the 50% threshold. Assuming parties do not have exact
control over electoral outcomes, such a partisan effect can be identified by comparing states just below the
50% cutoff c with states just above this cutoff. Formally, the partisan effect τ can be expressed as
τ = limx↑cE[Enactmentit|Xit = x]− limx↓cE[Enactmentit|Xit = x], (1)
where Enactmentit is an indicator variable that is equal to one if state i enacts a reform at time t
and Xit is the Republicans’ winning margin (Republicans’ vote share minus Democrats’ vote share). The
simplest approach to estimate (1) is to compute the mean difference in a range of Xit above and below
the threshold. However, if the vote share of Republicans is correlated with the risk of reform enactment,
this mean difference would be biased, as E[Enactmentit|Xit = x] would have a non-zero slope. A practical
solution to this problem is to estimate a simple linear probability model of the form
Enactmentit = τD + g(Xit) + Z
′β + it, (2)
where D is an indicator variable equal to one if Xit > c; g(Xit) is a linear function or a polynomial of the
Republicans’ winning margin Xit; Z is a matrix of control variables; and it is an idiosyncratic error term.9
9Note that the inclusion of a polynomial or spline function of the Republicans’ winning margin most flexibly ensures that an
increase or decrease in the risk of reform enactment around the threshold is not misinterpreted as a discontinuity when, in fact,
it simply represents a nonlinear relationship between Xit and Enactmentit. However, high-order polynomials might result in
misleading estimators for the discontinuity parameter (Gelman and Imbens 2014). We thus only use polynomials of order 2 in
our analyes.
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Model (2), however, ignores the timing of reform enactments and thus important information in our data.
As we want to study the forces accelerating the reform process or, in other words, to investigate the factors
increasing or decreasing the instantaneous risk of reform enactment in a state, our empirical strategy relies
on survival analysis. The focus thus lies on the duration t that a state is at risk of tort reform enactment,
before the reform is actually introduced. Stated technically, we are interested in the hazard rate of tort
reform enactment λ(t), which can be described as the instantaneous risk of reform enactment at time t given
the reform has not yet been enacted. Assuming continuous time, this can be written formally as
λ(t) =
f(t)
1− F (t) =
f(t)
S(t)
(3)
where λ(t) is the hazard rate of tort reform enactment, f(t) is the density function of durations to
enactment, F (t) is the probability distribution of durations to enactment and S(t) is the survivor function
of durations to enactment.
In sum, in order to assess a partisan effect on the hazard rate of reform enactment, we apply the RDD
approach outlined above to the Cox proportional hazards model (Cox 1972, hereafter Cox model). Formally,
the Cox model can be expressed as
λ(t|Xt) = λ0(t)eβ′Xt (4)
where λ(t|Xt) is the hazard rate of reform enactment given X at time t; λ0(t) is the underlying baseline
hazard of reform enactment; β is a vector of regression coefficients, and Xt a matrix of explanatory factors.
The Cox model allows us to estimate τ as a multiplicative effect on the baseline hazard of tort reform
enactment λ0(t) by exploiting the information of the timing of reforms. The goal is thus to apply a statistical
procedure that allows us to make statements like: “States just above the threshold of 50% Republican votes in
the gubernatorial elections had a x% higher hazard of reform enactment than states just below this threshold.”
4.2 The Cox proportional hazards model in an RDD context
As the use of Cox models in an RDD context is rather novel in the economic literature, we guide the
reader step by step through our empirical approach (see Bor et al. 2014 for a general introduction to the
application of proportional hazards models in an RDD context, as well as Pintoff 2004 for an early application
in economics). In addition, we illustrate the properties of and intuition behind the Cox model in an RDD
context with a Monte Carlo study presented in the Appendix to this paper.
First, we express the right-hand side of (1) as a difference of expected hazard rates given the Republicans’
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winning margin
limx↑cE[λ(t|Xit = x)]− limx↓cE[λ(t|Xit = x)]. (5)
By inserting the right-hand side of (2) into (4) we can rewrite (5) as
limx↑cE[λ0(t)e(τD=1+g(Xit)+Z
′β)]− limx↓cE[λ0(t)e(τD=0+g(Xit)+Z′β)] = eτ . (6)
In the context of hazard modeling, we can thus estimate the partisan effect as the exponentiated estimated
coefficient τˆ from a Cox model of the form
λ(t|Xit = x) = λ0(t)e(τD+g(Xit)+Z′β). (7)
By fitting (7) for a range of Xit around the threshold of the Republican’s winning margin of 0 (i.e.,
50% of Republican votes), we can interpret the estimated hazard ratio eτˆ as the average partisan effect on
the hazard of tort reform enactment. We thus identify the partisan effect based on a subset of states with
generally competitive elections. Note that these states, in the context of hazards modeling, need to remain
in the sample throughout the whole time period of the analysis. As we are interested in the timing of reform
enactments, we cannot include a particular state just for a few years due to one narrow election and then
exclude it again. The sample thus consists of states that were generally contested throughout a certain period
of time during which many reforms were enacted.
Specifically, we select states that never exceed a certain bandwidth around the threshold throughout the
time-frame under analysis. Figure 2 illustrates this point. From the three depicted states only state A fulfills
the requirement for the whole observation period. State C only fulfills it for the first 13 years and state B -
given the exemplary bandwidth of 12 percentage points - never fulfills the requirement.
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Figure 2: Selection of subsamples
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4.3 Estimation with repeated events
Since the underlying real-world distribution of durations to tort reform enactment is unknown and since the
literature lacks – to our best knowledge – any theoretical approach for approximating this distribution, we
do not parametrize the underlying baseline hazard λ0(t). Instead, we rely on Cox’ partial-likelihood method
(Cox 1972) to set up and maximize the log-likelihood for (7).10 The advantage of this approach is that we do
not need any assumption about the underlying distribution of t.11 The downside of this approach is its lower
efficiency, as it can only take the order of events (reform enactments) into account, but not their distribution.
We take a general view of the reform process by looking at reform events as such. A single state may thus
experience the event of passing a reform several times. This allows for identification of the partisan effect as
a driving force of the overall reform process. Our empirical model is essentially the same as (7). However,
the dataset is structured differently than in a standard Cox model. All states stay in the risk set for the
entire observation period whether they enacted one or several reforms or no reform at all.12
We apply two distinct techniques to analyze the data in this structure. First, we estimate a model with
the approach suggested by Andersen and Gill (1982), often referred to as the counting process approach or the
10In the case of tied events, such a model cannot be estimated directly. Since different states happen to enact some reforms in
the same year, this is an issue in our study. We use the Efron method to deal with this problem (see Therneau and Grambsch
2000 for a discussion of handling tied events in a Cox model).
11In this respect, our empirical strategy diverges significantly from the one applied by Miceli and Stone (2013), who rely on
the assumption that t is Weibull-distributed.
12Reform bills that included more than one issue are treated as one reform enactment in a given year.
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independent increment model (IIM; Therneau and Hamilton 1997), which is probably the simplest approach
to estimate a Cox-like model with repeated events. It is important to note, though, that this implies the
assumption that reform enactments are independent of each other, which furthermore implies that the risk of
reform enactment for any state is not affected by any earlier reform in this state. This assumption is rather
problematic because, for example, the passage of one reform might reduce the pressure for additional reforms.
Therefore, we also apply the ’conditional’ approach suggested by Prentice et al. (1981) as an alternative.13
The conditional model (CM) takes the sequence of events into account and is therefore considered to be
more efficient and thus often preferable when analyzing repeated events data (Box-Steffensmeier and Zorn
2002). The CM approach exploits the sequence of events by using exactly the same data layout as the IIM
but applies a stratified Cox model instead of a standard Cox model. The stratum variable is defined by the
number of events experienced. Hence, a state is in stratum 1 when it is at risk of experiencing the first reform
enactment. As soon as the first reform has been enacted, the state changes to stratum 2. We apply the CM
approach for all estimations focussed on the identification of a partisan effect.
A potential problem with repeated events is the lack of independence within states. From the same state,
two or more reform enactments may be included in the data set and be affected by the same unobserved factors
leading to correlations among them. Therefore, the assumed correlation structure might be misspecified. We
compute robust standard errors (clustered at the state level) to adjust for this potential misspecification.
5 Data
5.1 Tort reform data
Information on tort reforms for our empirical analysis comes from the Database of State Tort Law Reforms
(DSTLR 3rd, Avraham 2011a). This dataset contains the most prevalent medical malpractice reforms between
1980 and 2008. It has been updated and improved several times over the last few years.14 Since a large variety
of reforms have been passed, there are many ways to code such data for analysis. In this paper, we rely mainly
on the coding suggested by Avraham (2011a).15 In particular, we use the dataset version ‘DSTLR 3rd (clever)’
in our main analysis, from which reforms that were identified by Avraham (2011a) as having no impact were
removed. In other words, reforms that are not restrictive in practice, such as caps that are very high or only
applicable in certain circumstances, are excluded from this dataset. Nevertheless, for all of our analyses, we
diverge and adjust the coding in two directions. First, we exclude all reforms that have been enacted by a
13This method is also called the stratified counting process approach (Kleinbaum and Klein 2005).
14In our dataset, we have incorporated all further improvements to DSTLR 3rd published in Avraham (2011b).
15See Avraham (2011b) for a detailed description of how the reform data was coded.
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judicial decision (reforms by common law). We thus retain only the reforms that are written in the civil code
or statutes of a state.16 Second, we make sure that the timing of each reform is coded according to the year
of actual enactment.17
The information base that we exploit thus consists of the year(s) of actual enactment of tort reforms
for five different types (as described in Subsection 3.1) across all U.S. states except Nebraska.18 From this
information, we compute the durations to reform enactment by defining the year 1980 as the starting point of
the observation period. The choice of 1980 as the beginning of the observation period is somewhat arbitrary,
because it implies the assumption that all states only started to be at risk of reform in that year. Making
such an assumption is hardly avoidable when analyzing the passage of policies with proportional hazards
models. Unlike in other applications of these methods (such as the analysis of unemployment spells), it is per
se unclear when the individual (in our case a state legislature) enters the risk set. A prominent case of policy
innovation by one state would be a sound reason to set the beginning of observation for other states. One
could argue that the frequently cited tort reforms enacted by the California legislature in 1975 represent such
a prominent case of policy innovation in the context of tort law. However, this would ignore the fact that
some states’ constitutions or common law contain liability limiting rules, such as caps on punitive damages
that date back to the 19th century (Avraham 2011b). U.S. states have thus been at risk of reforming their
law of torts since they came into existence.19
We count 20 reforms defining caps on punitive damages, with Illinois and Wisconsin being the first states
in 1985. Reforms involving punitive evidence are observed in 23 states, for the first time in Indiana in
1984. Caps on non-economic damages are coded for 21 states, beginning with Colorado, Kansas, Maryland,
Minnesota and Missouri in 1986. Collateral source rule reforms started in New York in 1984, and have been
enacted in 19 states so far. Finally, for joint and several liability reforms, we observe reforms in 31 states,
with Louisiana being the first in 1980. Figure 3 shows the distribution of the five types of reforms over time.
While reforms of the collateral source rule and joint and several liability were enacted relatively early during
the first big wave of reforms in 1985/1986, the enactments of other types of tort reform are distributed more
16Table A1 in the Appendix gives an overview of the states and reforms included in each analysis. Additionally, a list with
the reforms identified as enacted by a judicial decision and thus excluded from the dataset can also be found in the Appendix.
17This was necessary because the original coding treats reforms that were enacted after June in year t as belonging to the
next calendar year t+ 1 (Avraham 2011b).
18We exclude data on Nebraska from the analysis due to the lack of information on party strength in its nonpartisan legislature.
19However, there are some reasons to set 1980 as the beginning of observation in our study. First, when setting the beginning
of the observation period to any year before 1980, we risk losing accuracy in the reform data. Although DSTLR also mentions
reforms that were enacted before 1980, it is much more complete and accurate for the time after. The same is true for some
of our explanatory variables mentioned below. Second, our approach is in agreement with Klick and Sharkey (2009:8), who
argue that “there is no particularly principled way to date the beginning point of when a state could have possibly adopted a
punitive damage cap” and set the beginning of observation also according to the availability of data. Miceli and Stone (2013:117)
strategically choose 1981 as the starting point in their analysis “to coincide with the year in which the California Supreme Court
rendered the Grimshaw decision”. We do not follow this argumentation, because Grimshaw was a case of product liability tort
law, while the data we use mainly contains reforms of medical malpractice tort law.
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equally over time.
Figure 3: Distribution of tort reform enactments over time
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Data source: Avraham (2011a).
5.2 Explanatory variables
Our main explanatory variables are the Republicans’ majority margin in the legislative assemblies and the
Republicans’ winning margin in gubernatorial elections, respectively. The latter is computed based on the
official gubernatorial election data provided by the Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social
Research (1984) for the years 1980 to 1990 and from Leip (2013) for the years 1991 to 2008. The percentage
of Republicans in a state’s lower and upper house, respectively, are taken from the State Politics and Policy
Quarterly State Dataset (Lindquist 2007) and for recent years from the U.S. Census Bureau.
In the case of the legislature, our assignment variable Xit for every year t and state i is the Republicans’
current majority margin in the respective assembly computed as the percentage of Republican seats in the
assembly minus 50 percentage points.
In the case of governors, our assignment variableXit for every year t and state i is the Republicans’ winning
margin in the last gubernatorial elections computed as the difference between the percent of Republican votes
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minus the percent of Democratic votes.20 The treatment dummy D in the case of governors is equal to one
if the current governor is Republican.
The central underlying assumption of our identification strategy is that parties have imprecise control
over the election outcomes (i.e., the assignment variable). This implies continuity at the threshold. McCrary
(2008) suggests an intuitive test of whether there is a discontinuity in the aggregate distribution (i.e., the
density) of the assignment variable. We present the test results as well as a graphic illustration of the
assignment variable’s aggregate distribution in Figure 4.
Figure 4: Aggregate distributions of Republican winning margins
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Notes: The panel shows density plots of the three aggregate assignment variables and results of the test
suggested by McCrary (2008). Data sources: Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social Research
(1984), Leip (2013), and Lindquist (2007).
20In nine states some of the gubernatorial elections were not decided between a Democrat and a Republican. These states are
excluded from the analysis.)
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The p-values indicated in Figure 4 stand for the probability of observing this pattern in the data if the
data generating process incorporates a continuous density of the assignment variable (H0; the null hypothesis
in McCrary’s test). For both the Republican winning margin in gubernatorial elections and the Republican
majority margin in the lower houses, the null hypothesis of continuity cannot be rejected. However, in the
case of the Republican majority margin in the upper houses, H0 is rejected. Any partisan effect estimated
based on the upper house data must thus be interpreted with caution as it might simply result from the
discontinuity in the assignment variable. We thus focus our analysis on the governor and the lower house.
In addition, we collected a series of state-level control variables that are included in some specifications.
These variables involve a measure for the liability risk in 1983. It allows controlling for the reform pressure in
a state in the early 1980s. Moreover, these variables capture the general political orientation of the electorate
(DW-Nominate scores), the strength of interest groups (proxied by the health and legal sectors’ share of
gross state product), the level of income (real gross state product per capita), as well as the composition of
the legislature (fraction of women and fraction of lawyer-legislators). Detailed information on each of these
variables is presented in the Appendix. The inclusion of controls in an RDD context should not matter for
the coefficients of interest (i.e., the estimation of a partisan effect at the threshold). Apart from checking the
validity of the RDD approach, the inclusion of control variables is, however, useful as it potentially increases
the efficiency of the estimator.
Table 1 shows some descriptive statistics for the main explanatory variables as well as the control variables
used in our analyses.
5.3 Sample selection
The strategy used to identify a partisan effect relies on the selection of sub-samples containing states with
generally contested elections. As explained in Subsection 4.2, we require that the election outcomes are
within a certain bandwidth around the threshold throughout the time for which the analysis is undertaken.
This selection and thus the feasibility of our empirical approach face some constraints that are inherent to
the data we use. The narrower the bandwidth, the less likely it is that a certain state’s election outcomes
fulfill the requirement. However, if we restrict the analysis to a shorter time period fewer states and events
are excluded.
In a supplementary analysis, we explored how our sample is affected by a bandwidth of +/−15 percentage
around the threshold that states must not exceed for different time-frames for the years from 1980 to 2008.
Thereby, we keep the beginning of the time-frames fixed at 1980 and vary the last year of the risk set. This
investigation suggests that an analysis is well feasible with a moderate bandwidth of +/ − 15 percentage
17
Table 1: Summary statistics for the independent variables (all reforms pooled)
Mean Std.dev. Median Min. Max. Range
Governor: Republican winning margin>0 0.48 0.50 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00
Governor: Republican winning margin -1.59 20.19 -0.97 -64.80 58.34 123.14
LH: Republican majority margin>0 0.36 0.48 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00
LH: Republican majority margin -5.97 17.32 -5.63 -46.72 37.14 83.86
UH: Republican majority margin>0 0.41 0.49 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00
UH:Republican majority margin -6.16 17.95 -4.55 -50.00 41.43 91.43
Republicans in legislature (%) 43.93 17.01 45.41 1.90 89.29 87.38
Attorneys in legislature (%) 16.43 8.53 16.33 0.00 51.67 51.67
Women in legislature (%) 17.83 8.38 17.14 0.82 42.35 41.53
GSP health industry (%) 5.73 1.57 5.61 1.04 11.35 10.31
GSP legal industry (%) 1.04 0.40 0.98 0.28 3.09 2.82
Liberal political orientation -0.05 0.24 -0.02 -0.65 0.53 1.19
Liability risk (in USD 100) 55.33 29.05 48.90 7.45 151.80 144.35
Real GSP p.c. (in USD 1,000) 17.89 4.57 17.18 9.96 57.26 47.30
Notes: N= 1421. The data consist of yearly observations for 49 U.S. states (We exclude data on
Nebraska from the analysis due to the lack of information on party strength in its nonpartisan legis-
lature.) from 1980 to 2008.
Data source: See main text in Section 5 and the data Appendix.
points in the case of the lower houses. The number of states varies between 19 (up to 1991) and 12 (for a
sample up to 2008), while the number of events is strictly above 20. A sample restriction tends, however, not
to be feasible in the case of gubernatorial elections. Here, no restriction of the time-frame leads to more than
13 events and 9 states. Moreover, for longer time-frames, the numbers of states and events is not greater
than 5, leaving basically no variation in the data to estimate a proportional hazards model.21
6 Results
We present our results in three subsections. In order to arrive at a general understanding of the covariates of
the state level tort reform process, we start with results from Cox models that include the average share of
Republicans in a state’s legislature as a continuous measure as well as an indicator for Republican governors
(Section 6.1). Subsequently, we present the main analyses for the specific partisan effect of a legislature (lower
house) dominated by a Republican majority (Section 6.2). We first show global estimates of the partisan
effect for different specifications of model (7). Second, we present local estimates of the partisan effect for
different time ranges as well as for different sample restrictions. Finally, we document the findings for the
21Details of these analyses are illustrated in Figure A2 in the Appendix. In addition, Table A4 in the Appendix lists the states
remaining in each subsample.
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partisan effect in the case of a Republican governor (Section 6.3).
As there is no straightforward interpretation of the estimated coefficients in a Cox model, the tables report
exponentiated coefficients. An exponentiated coefficient from a Cox model represents the multiplicative effect
of the corresponding variable on the underlying baseline hazard (i.e. an exponentiated coefficient of 1.1
indicates that an increase of one unit in the corresponding variable ceteris paribus increases the hazard by
1.1− 1 = 0.1 = 10%).
6.1 Cox model estimates for the covariates of tort reform enactment
Table 2 presents the findings for the malpractice tort reform process as a whole. Similar results are obtained for
the unconditional Cox-like model with repeated events (IIM) in columns (1), (3), and (5) and the conditional
model (CM) in columns (2), (4), and (6). Strikingly, liability risk, i.e., the indicator for reform pressure,
is not statistically related with the hazard of overall reform enactment. The respective multiplicative effect
on the hazard is close to 1 with z-values of the underlying coefficient ranging from -0.05 to -1.316. This
result fails to support our first hypothesis, but echoes the finding that large individual jury awards are not
systematically related to tort reforms across states (Klick and Sharkey 2009).
In contrast, the political orientation in a state is systematically related to the adoption of reforms as
indicated in specifications (1) and (2). For a one-standard-deviation more liberal orientation, the overall
reform hazard is roughly 17% lower (= (0.3 − 1) × 0.24). Specifications (3) and (4) indicate that political
orientation primarily works via the partisan composition of the state legislature and the party affiliation of
the governor. If the fraction of Republicans in the legislature is higher by one percentage point, the hazard
of reform is increased by 2.2%. For one standard deviation in the strength of the Republican party, the
corresponding effect on the hazard is about 34% (= (1.02 − 1) × 17). If a Republican governor is in charge
rather than a Democrat governor, the hazard of reform is around 46% higher. With these two party variables
included, there is no independent effect of the general political orientation on the tort reform process. The
evidence supports the idea that U.S. tort reforms at the state level are systematically affected by politico-
economic forces. The finding is corroborated in specifications (5) and (6) where the correlated variable
political orientation is not included. However, no conclusions can be drawn on whether the correlations
for the party variables primarily reflect voter preferences (second hypothesis) or a partisan effect due to an
amalgam of ideology and special interests (third hypothesis). We address this issue in the next section.
A substantial effect is also found for the fraction of women. With a one-percentage-point stronger presence
of women in a legislature the hazard of reform is lowered by 3.8% to 4.2%. This result indicates that female
legislators have played an important role in opposing the ongoing malpractice tort reform process towards less
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liability. No systematic effects are found for the economic importance of the health and the legal industry,
the share of attorneys in a legislature or gross state product per capita.
Table 2: Determinants of the overall malpractice reform process in U.S. states between 1980 and 2008
exp(Coefficient) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Liability risk (in USD 100) 1.000 1.000 0.996 0.996 0.995 0.995
(-0.118) (-0.050) (-1.018) (-0.839) (-1.316) (-1.013)
Liberal political orientation 0.345 ** 0.307 ** 0.635 0.632
(-2.225) (-2.218) (-0.435) (-0.390)
Republicans in legislature (%) 1.020 * 1.022 * 1.023 *** 1.025 ***
(1.755) (1.659) (3.480) (3.143)
Republican governor 1.460 ** 1.455 * 1.439 ** 1.430 *
(2.034) (1.815) (1.993) (1.800)
GSP health industry (%) 1.024 0.970 0.974 0.928
(0.148) (-0.183) (-0.220) (-0.547)
GSP legal industry (%) 1.517 1.666 1.563 1.677
(1.269) (1.240) (1.412) (1.285)
Attorneys in legislature (%) 0.999 1.001 0.998 1.001
(-0.091) (0.075) (-0.154) (0.045)
Women in legislature (%) 0.959 *** 0.962 ** 0.958 *** 0.961 **
(-2.813) (-2.133) (-2.767) (-2.142)
Real GSP p.c. (USD 1,000) 0.952 0.966 0.979 0.978 0.971 0.971
(-1.383) (-0.969) (-0.473) (-0.452) (-0.631) (-0.590)
No. of observations 1421 1421 1421 1421 1421 1421
No. of events 92 92 92 92 92 92
Logrank test (p) 0.06 0.094 0.005 0.009 0.008 0.014
Approach IIM CM IIM CM IIM CM
Notes: Cox-like proportional hazards models with repeated events. Specifications (1), (3), and
(5) are based on an independent increment model. Specifications (2), (4), and (6) are based on a
conditional model. Standard errors are clustered at the state level. Z-values of the coefficients are
in parentheses. Statistical significance: * 0.1>p>0.05, ** 0.05>p>0.01 and *** p<0.01. No. of
observations reflects total state-year observations at risk (49 states over 29 years).
Data sources: Avraham (2011a) for data on tort reforms (only restrictive reforms). For data on
independent variables, see main text, Section 5 and Appendix.
6.2 Legislative partisan effect on the hazard of tort reform enactment
In order to achieve a better understanding of the partisan channel in the tort reform process, we apply the
identification strategy outlined above to the state’s lower houses.
Table 3 presents the findings for a partisan effect on the hazard of medical malpractice tort reform
enactment (for all estimations we use the CM approach). They are based on different specifications of model
(7) and estimated globally based on the whole sample. The focus is thus on eτ , i.e., the estimated jump at
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the threshold of 50 percent of the seats.22
Table 3: Global regression results: legislative partisan effect
(1) (2) (3) (4)
eτ 1.923 2.004 * 2.132 * 2.355 **
Z-value 1.617 1.676 1.903 2.286
g(X) linear linear quadratic quadratic
Controls No Yes No Yes
No. of observations 1421 1421 1421 1421
No. of events 92 92 92 92
Wald test 6.68 (p 0.035) 38.38 (p 0) 7.43 (p 0.059) 42.59 (p 0)
Likelihood ratio test 9.173 (p 0.01) 21.026 (p 0.021) 10.165 (p 0.017) 23.824 (p 0.013)
Notes: Cox-like proportional hazards models with repeated events. All specifications are based
on a conditional model. Standard errors are clustered at the state level. Statistical significance:
* 0.1>p>0.05, ** 0.05>p>0.01 and *** p<0.01. No. of observations reflects total state-year
observations at risk (49 states over 29 years).
Data sources: Avraham (2011a) for data on tort reforms (only restrictive reforms). For data
on independent variables, see main text in Section 5.
The results indicate a substantial discontinuity in the hazard of reform enactment at the threshold of
a Republican majority in the lower house. The exponentiated estimated coefficient τ indicates an around
twice as high instantaneous risk of tort reform enactment in states with a Republican majority compared
to states with a Democratic majority. The point estimates are statistically significant for three out of four
specifications. This finding can be interpreted as evidence of a rather strong partisan effect. Note that the
inclusion of control variables hardly affects the size of the point estimates but does, as expected, increase the
efficiency of the estimator. Following Bor et al. (2014), we illustrate the estimated discontinuity based on
predicted hazards for different values of the assignment variable (here: the share of Republicans in the lower
houses). Figure 5 depicts fitted values from the quadratic specification (3) in Table 3.
22The coefficients of the other independent variables are not reported in the table. However, Table A5 in the Appendix
presents all coefficient estimates, including the control variables.
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Figure 5: Republican majority margin and tort reform hazard rate
−1.0
−0.5
0.0
0.5
−50 −25 0 25 50
Republican majority margin in the lower house (percentage points)
To
rt 
re
fo
rm
 h
az
ar
d 
ra
te
Notes: Predicted hazards from specification (3) in Table 3 are displayed as solid lines. The dashed line
shows extrapolated predictions based on the estimated model below the threshold (τ ×D = 0). The dots are
hazards predicted for Republican majority margin count bins of 5 percentage points width.
In order to get closer to a causal interpretation of the estimated partisan effect eτ , we re-estimate specifi-
cation (4) in Table 3 for different samples of states that were generally contested over a certain period of time.
In particular, we include only those states in the sub-sample in which from the beginning of the observation
period until year y the majority margin of either party was constantly below 15 percentage points. The idea
is thus to estimate the effect of a Republican majority in the lower house for states where in some years the
Republicans had a narrow majority and in others the Democrats just won the elections by a narrow margin.
The selection of the sub-samples thus has to trade off a higher number of states against a longer time-frame
for the analysis. By varying y over the range of 1988 to 2008, we make sure that we do not over-interpret
one specific result stemming from one state/time-frame combination. Figure 6 presents the resulting expo-
nentiated point estimates for the partisan effect (with respective 90% confidence intervals) ordered according
to the last year y of the respective sample’s risk set.
The results indicate that for those states in which the share of Republicans was just around the majority
threshold for the longest period of time, there is a clear positive discontinuity in the hazard of reform
enactment. The measured partisan effects are similar in magnitude to the estimated global effect presented
in Table 3. The estimates indicate that for states with electorates of comparable political ideologies, a narrow
Republican majority in the lower house is associated with a hazard of tort reform enactment around two
to three times as high as with a narrow Democratic majority. Note that for these estimates we exploit
substantial cross-sectional as well as longitudinal variation in the data. In the case of y = 2008, for example,
in 8 of 12 states with narrow election results, majorities in the lower house switched between Democrats and
Republicans during the observation period. In total, there are 34 switches in party majority in that specific
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Figure 6: Estimated partisan effect for generally contested states
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Notes: Estimated hazard ratios and 10% confidence intervals based on specification (4) in Table 3 for different
time-frames and states in which the Republicans’ absolute winning margin never exceeded 15 percentage
points.
Data sources: Avraham (2011a) for data on tort reforms (only restrictive reforms). For data on independent
variables, see main text in Section 5 and Appendix.
sub-sample.
6.3 Executive partisan effect on the hazard of tort reform enactment
Table 4 presents the findings for the partisan effect of a Republican governor on the hazard of tort reform
enactment. It is estimated globally and based on the whole sample.
The results indicate a statistically significant jump in the hazard rate at the threshold. The inclusion
of controls only slightly affects the size of the point estimate but - as in the previous analysis - reduces the
size of the standard errors. As the data on gubernatorial elections do not allow a restriction of the sample
to observations more closely around the threshold over a long time period, the evidence presented has to be
interpreted with caution. Note, though, that in 39 out of 40 states there was at least one switch in the party
holding the governorship over the observation period.
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Table 4: Global regression results: executive partisan effect
(1) (2) (3) (4)
eτ 1.827 * 1.913 ** 1.775 1.894 *
Z-value 1.675 2.002 1.551 1.924
No. of observations 1160 1160 1160 1160
No. of events 76 76 76 76
Wald test 6.82 (p 0.033) 33.98 (p 0) 10.12 (p 0.018) 36.11 (p 0)
Likelihood ratio test 5.132 (p 0.077) 25.171 (p 0.005) 6.369 (p 0.095) 25.356 (p 0.008)
g(X) linear linear quadratic quadratic
Controls No Yes No Yes
Notes: Cox-like proportional hazards models with repeated events. All specifications are based
on a conditional model. Standard errors are clustered at the state level. Statistical significance:
* 0.1>p>0.05, ** 0.05>p>0.01 and *** p<0.01. No. of observations reflects total state-year
observations at risk (49 states over 29 years).
Data sources: Avraham (2011a) for data on tort reforms (only restrictive reforms). For data
on independent variables, see main text in Section 5 and Appendix.
7 Concluding remarks
U.S. tort reform is not only a controversial issue in terms of substantive law, but also in terms of understanding
its drivers in the political process. There are many reports that emphasize the predominant role that special
interest politics plays in shaping the reform process rather than a process of trial and error towards a tort
law that is most beneficial for citizens. In order to better understand the reform process, we formulated
some general hypotheses on the main forces behind tort reforms and studied them with regard to medical
malpractice tort law at the state level for the United States. In so doing, we have to address the challenge
that it is difficult to separate the different forces empirically, in particular, if constituency preferences as well
as the position of special interest groups are potentially correlated with relative party strength. In order to
identify the strength of special interests and ideology tied to the two main parties, we focus on a specific
partisan effect. If relative party strength in politics primarily reflects underlying voter preferences, reform
enactments are expected to be a continuous function of party representation. However, if there are special
interests that gain and lose influence when one or the other party has the majority in the legislature, the
likelihood of reforms is expected to change systematically at this threshold. A similar discontinuity in reform
enactment is expected to hold if the governorship changes hands from one party to the other.
Based on Cox proportional hazards estimations, we find evidence that relative party strength in state
legislatures and governors’ party affiliations are related to the enactment of tort reforms. The stronger
Republican representation is in politics, the more likely it is that a reform will be passed at any point in time.
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For the estimation of a specific partisan effect, we apply the idea behind the regression discontinuity design
and augment the Cox proportional hazards model accordingly. We find a substantial partisan effect in the
case of the lower house, with around a 100 percent higher hazard of reform enactment with a Republican
rather than a Democratic majority. This holds if we restrict the sample to states with generally contested
elections. A partisan effect of similar magnitude is estimated for a Republican governorship. The respective
estimate has to rely on the full sample. As a supplementary finding, we observe that the hazard of reform
is systematically lower when there is a larger fraction of female legislators. This is consistent with gender-
specific consequences of tort reforms being less beneficial or even harmful to women. No evidence is found for
a functional explanation of the reform process: there is no higher hazard of reform in states where physicians
faced a higher liability risk in the early 1980s.
The insights on the reform process have implications for the evaluation of the consequences of tort reforms.
Reform enactments should no longer be considered discrete random events, but should, instead, be expected
to entail further policy changes that are related to the political orientation of a state’s governor and legislators.
In other words, the validity of the common trend assumption in difference-in-differences analyses needs to be
studied carefully. We are convinced that further joint analyses of the tort reform process and its consequences
will help to provide a better understanding of its costs and benefits.
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Appendix
A.1 Monte Carlo study
We illustrate the intuition behind our empirical approach with a small Monte Carlo study.
Draws of simulated data
In our simulations, the data generating process has at its core a quadratic function of an assignment variable
X which is discontinuous at X > 0. For the systematic component of the data generating process, we first
draw the vector of the assignment variable from a uniform distribution, X ∼ U(−0.5, 0.5). We then generate
vector λ as λ = e(β1X+β2X
2+τ1[X>0]).
For 2,000 repetitions, we then use the systematic component λ to produce the dependent variable Y
(survival times) from the exponential distribution.
Results
We set the real parameter values as β1 = 0.3, β2 = −0.5, and τ = 0.2. In each repetition, we fit a Cox model
to the respective simulated sample and record the point estimate of τ . We illustrate the performance of the
Cox estimator of τ given the real parameter values and a sample size comparable to our real world data
set (N = 1500). Figure A1a displays the distribution of the point estimates for τ alongside the mean of all
repetitions as well as the real parameter value. On average, the point estimator for τ is numerically very close
to the real value of 0.2. For each estimated Cox model we then predict the hazard rate based on the estimated
coefficients and the random sample of explanatory variables. Figure A1b shows bins of the predicted hazard
rates for assignment variable values below and above the threshold of 0. The figure intuitively illustrates how
we can interpret the idea of an RDD in the context of proportional hazards modelling. The discontinuity
incorporated in the underlying data generating process can consistently be retrieved and reproduced by means
of a Cox proportional hazards model.
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A.2 Reforms in medical malpractice tort law by state
Table A1: Reforms and states included in individual reform analyses
State Punitive
damages
caps
Punitive evi-
dence
Non-
economic
damages
caps
Collateral-
source rule
Joint-and-
several
liability
Alaska 1997 1986 2005 1986
Alabama 1987 1987 1987 1987
Arkansas 2003 2003
Arizona 1987
California 1988 1986
Colorado 1986 1986 1986 1986
Connecticut 1985 1986
Delaware
Florida 1999 2003 1986
Georgia 1987 1987 2005 1987
Hawaii 1987 1987 1987
Iowa 1986 1984
Idaho 2003 1987 1987 1990 1987
Illinois 1985
Indiana 1995 1984 1986
Kansas 1987 1987 1986
Kentucky 1988 1988 1988
Louisiana 1980
Massachusetts 1986
Maryland 1986
Maine 1990
Michigan 1986 1986
Minnesota 1986 1985 1988
Missouri 2005 1986 1986 1986
Mississippi 1993 2003 1989
Montana 1985 1995 1987 1987
— Continued on next page —
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A.2 Reforms in medical malpractice tort law by state
Table A1: Reforms and states included in individual reform analyses
State Punitive
damages
caps
Punitive evi-
dence
Non-
economic
damages
caps
Collateral-
source rule
Joint-and-
several
liability
Alaska 19 7 1986 20 5 1986
Alabama 1987 1987 1987 1987
Arkansas 20 3 20 3
Arizona 1987
California 198 1986
Colorado 1986 1986 1986 1986
Con ecticut 1985 1986
Delaware
Florida 19 20 3 1986
Georgia 1987 1987 20 5 1987
Hawaii 1987 1987 1987
Iowa 1986 1984
Idaho 20 3 1987 1987 19 0 1987
Illinois 1985
Indiana 19 5 1984 1986
Kansas 1987 1987 1986
Kentucky 198 198 198
Louisiana 1980
Mas achuset s 1986
Maryland 1986
Maine 19 0
Michigan 1986 1986
Min esota 1986 1985 198
Mis ouri 20 5 1986 1986 1986
Mis is ip i 19 3 20 3 1989
Montana 1985 19 5 1987 1987
— Continued on next page —
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. f r s i ic l l r ctic t rt l st t
able 1: efor s and states included in individual refor analyses
State unitive
da ages
caps
unitive evi-
dence
on-
econo ic
da ages
caps
ol ateral-
source rule
Joint-and-
several
liability
laska 1997 1986 2005 1986
laba a 1987 1987 1987 1987
rkansas 2003 2003
rizona 1987
alifornia 1988 1986
olorado 1986 1986 1986 1986
onnecticut 1985 1986
ela are
lorida 1999 2003 1986
eorgia 1987 1987 2005 1987
a ai 1987 1987 1987
Io a 1986 1984
Idaho 2003 1987 1987 1990 1987
Il inois 1985
Indiana 1995 1984 1986
ansas 1987 1987 1986
entucky 1988 1988 1988
ouisiana 1980
assachusetts 1986
aryland 1986
aine 1990
ichigan 1986 1986
innesota 1986 1985 1988
issouri 2005 1986 1986 1986
ississippi 1993 2003 1989
ontana 1985 1995 1987 1987
ontinued on next page
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Table A1 – continued from previous page
State Punitive
damages
caps
Punitive evi-
dence
Non-
economic
damages
caps
Collateral-
source rule
Joint and
several
liability
North Carolina 1996 1996
North Dakota 1993 1987 1995 1987 1987
New Hampshire 1986 1990
New Jersey 1995 1995 1987 1987
New Mexico 1987
Nevada 1989 1989 2002 2002
New York 1984 1986
Ohio 2005 1988 2003
Oklahoma 1995 1987 2003 2003 2004
Oregon 1987 1987 1987 1987
Pennsylvania 1997 2002
Rhode Island
South Carolina 1988 2005 2005
South Dakota
Tennessee
Texas 1987 2003 1985
Utah 1989 1987 1986 1986
Virginia 1988
Vermont
Washington 1986
Wisconsin 1985 1995 1995 1995 1994
West Virginia 2003 2003 1986
Wyoming 1986
No. of reforms 20 25 22 20 34
Note: The indicated years refer to the first enactment (after 1979) of the respective reform
in the respective state.
Data source: Avraham (2011a).
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A.4 Data appendix: control variables
Liability index: To control for the reform pressure in a state in the early 1980s we use the liability risk
measure (i.e., an estimation of the expected liability costs) proposed by Helland and Showalter (2009). The
liability risk measure is based on detailed liability award data in Florida, in combination with aggregate
award data from all other states and is estimated by state and physicians’ field of specialization in 1983 and
1988. In our specifications we include the average expected liability costs (averaged over specialities, in USD
100) by state in the year 1983.
Liberal political orientation: The mean of the DW-Nominate scores (first dimension) of the members of
Congress is used as a proxy for the political preferences of a state’s electorate. The scores are based on
member of Congress’ roll call records. We code the scores such that higher ratings reflect a more liberal
attitude (the scores thus range from −1 to +1, whereby +1 reflects a most liberal political orientation).23
The data for this variable come from Voteview.com (2012).
Health sector share of gross state product (GSP) and legal sector share of GSP (in %): We use the
percentage of the health (legal) sectors’ contribution to the state’s gross domestic product as a proxy for the
financial and political power of the health (legal) lobby in a state. The data comes from the U.S. Department
of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis.
Real GSP per capita (in USD 1,000): Data on this variable come from the U.S. Department of Commerce,
Bureau of Economic Analysis.
Percentage of women in the legislature: Information on the percentage of women legislators is available
for all states and comes from the Center for American Women in Politics of the Eagleton Institute of Politics,
State University of New Jersey.
Percentage of attorneys in the legislature: Data on the professional composition of all U.S. state legislatures
is only available for the years 1986, 1993, 1995, and 2007. The data is based on surveys undertaken by the
National Conference of State Legislators.24 Values for unavailable years have been estimated in a first step
by keeping the percentage of attorneys in the legislature over each legislative period in each state constant
for which at least one year was available. The remaining missing values have been estimated using linear
interpolation.
23 See Poole and Rosenthal (1985) for a detailed introduction to DW-Nominate scores.
24Data for the initial waves comes from Rosenson (2006).
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A.5 Excluded reforms
Table A3: Common law reforms (excluded)
State Reform Citation Effective date
Arizona Punitive damages (evidence) Linthicum v. Nationwide Life
Ins. Co., 723 P.2d 675, 680
(Ariz. 1986)
July 23, 1986
Maine Punitive damages (evidence) Tuttel v. Raymond , 494 A.2d
1353 (Me. 1985)
June 21, 1985
Maryland Punitive damages (evidence) Owens-Illinois v. Zenobia, 601
A.2d 633 (Md. 1992)
February 14, 1992
Tennessee Joint and several liability McIntyre v. Balentine, 833
S.W.2d 52
May 4, 1992
Tennessee Punitive damages (evidence) Hodges v. S.C. Toof & Co., 833
S.W.2d 896
April 20, 1992
Notes: Reforms that have been identified as enacted by a judicial decision and have consequently
been excluded from the dataset used in our analyses. All information on the reforms mentioned
in this table is cited as written in Avraham (2011b).
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A.6 Sample selection
Figure A2: Aggregate distributions of Republican winning margins
Lower House
Governor
0
10
20
30
0
10
20
30
1990 1995 2000 2005
Year
Co
un
t Item
Events
States
Notes: The panel shows the counts of events and states in subsamples of states in which the (absolute)
Republican majority never exceeds 15 percentage points for varying time-frames (different last year of the
risk set). Data sources: See Section 5 in the main text.
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Table A4: States in selected subsamples with contested elections
Last year Lower House Governor
1988 AK, CA, DE, IA, IL, IN, KS, ME, MI, MN,
MT, NJ, OH, OR, PA, TN, VT, WA, WI
KS, MO, ND, NM, PA, TX, VA, WA, WI
1989 AK, CA, DE, IA, IL, IN, KS, ME, MI, MN,
MT, NJ, OH, OR, PA, TN, VT, WA, WI
KS, NM, PA, TX, VA, WI
1990 AK, CA, DE, IA, IL, IN, KS, ME, MI, MN,
MT, NJ, OH, OR, PA, TN, VT, WA, WI
KS, NM, PA, TX, VA, WI
1991 AK, CA, DE, IA, IL, IN, KS, ME, MI, MN,
MT, NJ, OH, OR, PA, TN, VT, WA, WI
KS, NM, TX, VA
1992 AK, CA, DE, IA, IL, IN, KS, ME, MI, MN,
MT, OH, OR, PA, TN, VT, WA, WI
KS, NM, TX, VA
1993 AK, CA, DE, IA, IL, IN, KS, ME, MI, MN,
MT, OH, OR, PA, TN, VT, WI
KS, NM, TX, VA
1994 AK, CA, DE, IA, IL, IN, KS, ME, MI, MN,
MT, OH, OR, PA, TN, VT, WI
KS, NM, TX
1995 AK, CA, IA, IL, IN, KS, ME, MI, MN, OH,
OR, PA, TN, VT, WI
NM, TX
1996 AK, CA, IA, IL, IN, KS, ME, MI, MN, OH,
OR, PA, TN, VT, WI
NM, TX
1997 AK, CA, IA, IL, IN, KS, ME, MI, MN, OH,
OR, PA, TN, VT, WI
NM, TX
1998 AK, CA, IA, IL, IN, KS, ME, MI, MN, OH,
OR, PA, TN, VT, WI
NM, TX
1999 AK, CA, IA, IL, IN, KS, ME, MI, MN, OH,
OR, PA, TN, VT, WI
NM
2000 AK, CA, IA, IL, IN, KS, ME, MI, MN, OH,
OR, PA, TN, VT, WI
NM
2001 CA, IA, IL, IN, KS, ME, MI, MN, OH, OR,
PA, TN, VT, WI
NM
2002 CA, IA, IL, IN, KS, ME, MI, MN, OH, OR,
PA, TN, VT, WI
NM
2003 CA, IA, IL, IN, KS, ME, MI, MN, OH, OR,
PA, TN, VT, WI
-
2004 CA, IA, IL, IN, KS, ME, MI, MN, OH, OR,
PA, TN, VT, WI
-
2005 CA, IA, IL, IN, ME, MI, MN, OH, OR, PA,
TN, VT, WI
-
2006 CA, IA, IL, IN, ME, MI, MN, OH, OR, PA,
TN, VT, WI
-
2007 CA, IA, IL, IN, ME, MI, MN, OH, OR, PA,
TN, WI
-
2008 CA, IA, IL, IN, ME, MI, MN, OH, OR, PA,
TN, WI
-
Notes: N= 1421. The data consist of yearly observations for 49 U.S. states (We exclude data on
Nebraska from the analysis due to the lack of information on party strength in its nonpartisan legis-
lature.) from 1980 to 2008.
Data source: See main text in Section 5 and the data Appendix.
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A.7 Additional results
Table A5: Global regression results: legislative partisan effect, all variables
(1) (2) (3) (4)
eτ 1.923 2.004 * 2.132 * 2.355 **
(1.617) (1.676) (1.903) (2.286)
LH: Republican majority margin 1.001 1.005 0.995 0.996
(0.088) (0.415) (-0.500) (-0.326)
LH: Republican majority margin2 1.000 0.999 *
(-1.146) (-1.805)
Governor: Republican winning margin 1.005 1.005
(0.978) (1.085)
Liability risk (in USD 100) 0.997 0.997
(-0.536) (-0.631)
Liberal political orientation 0.510 0.439
(-0.660) (-0.775)
GSP health industry (%) 1.027 0.987
(0.176) (-0.081)
GSP legal industry (%) 1.759 1.748
(1.435) (1.338)
Attorneys in legislature (%) 1.005 1.003
(0.243) (0.136)
Women in legislature (%) 0.964 * 0.964 *
(-1.833) (-1.781)
Real GSP p.c. (in USD 1,000) 0.972 0.957
(-0.485) (-0.688)
No. of observations 1421 1421 1421 1421
No. of events 92 92 92 92
Wald test 6.68 (p 0.035) 38.38 (p 0) 7.43 (p 0.059) 42.59 (p 0)
Likelihood ratio test 9.173 (p 0.01) 21.026 (p 0.021) 10.165 (p 0.017) 23.824 (p 0.013)
Notes: The presented estimates are exponentiated coefficients from Cox-like proportional hazards models
with repeated events. All specifications are based on a conditional model. Standard errors are clustered
at the state level. Statistical significance: * 0.1>p>0.05, ** 0.05>p>0.01 and *** p<0.01. No. of obser-
vations reflects total state-year observations at risk (49 states over 29 years).
Data sources: Avraham (2011a) for data on tort reforms (only restrictive reforms). For data on indepen-
dent variables, see main text in Section 5 and the data Appendix.
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